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The remunicipalization of local public services has been a heavily debated issue in Europe in 
the last decade. Empirical analyses of the factors driving remunicipalization have accordingly 
increased in recent years. However, the existing literature has paid little attention to whether 
politicians and managers share similar views on remunicipalization, and whether, in practice, 
this might eventually influence service provision decisions. To the best of our knowledge, this 
issue has been addressed solely for the US case [Hefetz and Warner (2007), Warner and Hefetz 
(2012), and Warner and Aldag (2019)].  
However, no evidence has been obtained about potential differences in the views of 
elected politicians and bureaucrats (i.e. technical staff) on the question of privatization and 
remunicipalization in Europe. While the ‘professional’ form of government is not as common 
in Europe as it is in the US, it can be assumed that technical staff working in departments 
responsible for local public services management and supervision exert some influence on the 
decisions taken regarding delivery choices and, in particular, about privatization or 
remunicipalization.  
This paper seeks to fill this gap in the literature. To do so, we use data obtained from a 
survey conducted for this specific purpose in Spanish municipalities, and for a wide set of public 
services. We find that technical staff express a stronger preference for private participation in 
service delivery than is shown by politicians, regardless of whether the latter are conservative 
or progressive in ideology. Similarly, we find that technical staff show a greater propensity for 
reform (either to privatize or remunicipalize) than do politicians. 
Empirical analysis of remunicipalization: Related literature 
Empirical evidence of drivers of remunicipalization 
Interest in the empirical analysis of the factors driving remunicipalization has grown in recent 
years, mirroring the attention devoted to it in political debates and case study reports. The first 
multivariate analyses would appear to be those conducted for the US by Warner and Hebdon 
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(2001) and, later, by Hefetz and Warner (2004, 2007, 2012). These studies conclude that, in 
general, reversals of privatization tend to be more pragmatic than ideologically driven 
decisions.  
Only recently have multivariate empirical studies been carried out for European 
countries. Chong, Saussier and Silverman (2015) analyze the factors accounting for the renewal 
of water contracts in France and find that ideology has little influence – if any – in decisions 
not to renew, while pragmatic considerations are more persuasive. Similar results are reported 
by Campos-Alba et al. (2017) in a study for Spain, where non-renewal decisions are driven by 
pragmatic considerations. Gradus and Budding (forthcoming) analyze privatization and 
remunicipalization in the Netherlands and find that conservative parties are more strongly 
opposed to remunicipalization while progressive parties are more opposed to privatization. In 
another study conducted in the Netherlands, Gradus, Schoute and Budding (2019) find that 
remunicipalization negatively relates to measurement difficulty and positively relates to 
average household income, but any potential association with ideology is not considered. 
Therefore, although robust evidence remains scant, the findings available suggest that the 
decision to remunicipalize is, as Voorn, van Genugten and van Thiel (2019) conclude, 
pragmatic rather than ideological.  
Politicians, managers and service delivery choices 
While conventional public choice theory recognizes the individual objectives of politicians and 
bureaucrats – basically, the preference for public delivery as a tool that allows them to promote 
their own goals, such as budget maximization, in recent years the theoretical literature in 
economics has begun to address differences in the policymaking objectives of politicians and 
bureaucrats. For example, Alesina and Tabellini (2007, 2008) claim that bureaucrats have a 
comparative advantage in the case of technical policymaking.  
That bureaucrats should have an advantage in policy implementation is consistent with 
insights from public administration that managing contracts (and managing reforms, in general) 
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requires managerial skills (Andrews and Boyne, 2010), and these are more prevalent in 
managerial governments than in politician-based governments. Hence, the former are expected 
to be more effective in dealing with problems of contract management and market competition 
(Hefetz and Warner, 2012).  
In the specific case of the relationship between managerial governments and 
remunicipalization, we are aware of evidence only from the US. Thus, while Hefetz and Warner 
(2007) and Warner and Hefetz (2012) find that professional managers do not remunicipalize 
more, Warner and Aldag (2019) find that a professional manager form of government is related 
to more remunicipalization. Hence, to date, the evidence is scarce and far from conclusive. 
In most European continental countries, city governments are non-managerial or 
political in style. In Spain, city government comprises elected city counselors, with 
responsibility for the city’s different services and departments, in which technical staff oversee 
all technical matters. Typically, members of this technical staff are public servants, and retain 
their positions even when there are changes in city government. For this reason, technical staff 
may not be as adverse to undertaking reforms as politicians, who will tend to avoid actions for 
which they can be blamed (Hood, 2010). However, we should not ignore other evidence that 
suggests that when politicians are under pressure from electoral competition, they may be more 
prone to initiate reforms (see Berliner and Erlich, 2015, and Bernecker, 2016). As such, the 
evidence is inconclusive, and the matter requires additional research.   
The data obtained from our survey allow us to distinguish between the delivery choice 
preferences of politicians and technical staff. Hart, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) point out that 
politicians can use government delivery of services to engage in patronage and so obtain 
political rents. Enikolopov (2014) finds positive evidence for this hypothesis, which is also 
consistent with views on bureaucrats’ preferences for externalization as presented by Dunleavy 
(1991) and James (2003). Hence, in line with theoretical arguments and available empirical 
evidence for city governments, we believe that differences in delivery preferences may exist 
5 
because of discrepancies in technical abilities to manage contracts. Furthermore, these 
differences may be attributable to the fact that public production is associated with the more 
active role played by elected officials, who have the political control of departments and 
agencies, whereas external production may be associated with a more active role being played 
by technical staff, who have a greater capacity for supervising and monitoring externalized 
services. 
Our first proposition (P1), therefore, is that politicians have a stronger preference than 
technical staff for public production. Our second proposition (P2) is that politicians have a 
weaker preference than technical staff for reforming the organization of service delivery. 
Institutional context 
The municipality is the core jurisdiction of local government in Spain. According to data from 
the Spanish National Statistics Institute (INE), in 2018, there are 8,124 municipalities. Many of 
these are extremely small: 5,872 municipalities (72% of the total) have fewer than 2,000 
inhabitants. This means the average population per municipality is low, standing at 5,751 in 
2018. Municipal councils in Spain are elected for a four-year term. Voting is based on party 
lists and municipal council members are elected on a proportional basis (but a party list must 
obtain at least 5% of the vote to be allocated council seats). Thereafter, council members elect 
the mayor at the first meeting of the newly elected city council (Warner and Bel, 2008).  
The members of the municipal government are appointed by the mayor, all of whom 
must be elected members of the city council. This means all government departments are 
headed by elected officials appointed by the mayor and staffed by technical workers, with the 
administrative status of public servants, to implement policies. Occasionally, and then only in 
Spain’s largest cities, professional managers are appointed to undertake the technical 
management of the city departments, but always under the direction of the local counselor who 
heads the department. 
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This brief overview of the basic characteristics of Spain’s municipal government shows 
that the mayor-council form of government is prevalent. The mayor is responsible for 
appointing the heads of departments from among the elected counselors sitting on the city 
council. Then, each department has technical staff (often made up of public servants) 
responsible for implementing the policies decided by the council. 
 
Data on privatization and remunicipalization  
Our sample comprises the 97 Spanish municipalities that answered our survey, sent out to all 
municipalities with more than 1,000 inhabitants in 2018. The size of the sample municipalities 
ranges from 1,150 inhabitants (Torrecampo) to 1.6 million (Barcelona), the largest city in our 
sample and the second largest city in Spain. The survey included questions about the current 
model of production of the 17 services described in Table A1 (see Appendix) and asked the 
respondents to express their opinion about the optimal production model.  
The survey was sent to the municipalities’ main council address without specifying the 
name or role of the addressee and asked the respondent to specify name, contact details and 
position on the city council. Thus, we received answers from quite a mix of respondents holding 
different positions on their respective city councils. Politicians are identified by their either 
being mayors, elected councilors, or holding positions of political confidence having been 
appointed directly by elected politicians. Technical staff are identified by their being public 
servants. Among the technical staff we find municipal and service managers, economic area 
managers, municipal technical engineers, administrative staff, technical service coordinators, 
public accounts controllers, service quality and evaluation managers, among others.  Thus, we 
obtained one completed survey per municipality, but we had no influence over who the exact 
respondent was completing and submitting the information.  
According to our survey, only 17.5% (17) of respondents reported at least one reform 
in the municipal production model over the preceding 5 years (See Table 1). Among these, 
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8.2% (8) reported one reform, 3.1% (3) reported two and the remaining 6.2% (6) reported more 
than two reforms, with four being the maximum. Among the municipalities reporting reforms, 
the vast majority corresponded strictly to either a privatization or remunicipalization, with the 
exception of two municipalities where both kinds of reform were reported to have been 
implemented in the same period.    
(Table 1 around here) 
According to our survey results, only 8.2% of municipalities declared having privatized 
at least one of their services by contracting it out or signing a public-private partnership (PPP) 
in the preceding 5 years. Half of these 8.2% municipalities carried out just one privatization 
(Table 1); the other half more than one, with three being the maximum number reported by one 
respondent. Of the services affected by these privatizations, one third were water utilities and a 
quarter sewerage collection (See Figure 1). Privatizations were also recorded in solid waste 
collection, civil protection, parks and social action.    
(Figure 1 around here) 
In contrast, 11.3% of municipalities reported having implemented at least one 
remunicipalization in the preceding 5 years. Thus, only a few municipalities carried out some 
form of reversed privatization and about a half of these did so as an isolated instance, having 
no effect on the rest of their services. Only 5.1% of all municipalities reported implementing 
more than one remunicipalization and just 1% reported more than two remunicipalizations, with 
four being the maximum number in the sample. 
Interestingly, the services most frequently remunicipalized were very similar to those 
that were privatized during the period (see Figure 1). Thus, reverse privatizations were most 
frequent in water distribution and sewerage and waste collection. To a lesser degree, we also 
find remunicipalizations in road pavement, parks, public lights and civil protection.  
Following these reforms, the current distribution of production models in our sample 
can be summarized as in Table 2, ordered by the percentage of public production. Technical-
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type services related to solid waste management, urban transportation, and water distribution 
are those for which private involvement is highest. In contrast, personal services and those 
related to environmental action have the highest degree of public production. In terms of the 
dynamics of these service delivery choices, a comparison of the current distribution with data 
available for 2003 for solid waste collection and water distribution (Bel, 2006: 113 & 125) 
shows that the share of public production has remained extremely stable.  
(Insert Table 2 around here) 
 
Service delivery preferences of politicians and bureaucrats  
To evaluate differences in perception of the relative optimality of production models as 
expressed by politicians and technical staff – i.e. stated preferences for public or private 
involvement – we exploit our survey responses. Respondents were also asked to record the 
official post they held on the city council which enabled us to identify and assign the respective 
roles of either politician or member of the technical staff. From our sample, 45% of respondents 
were classified as politicians and 55% as technical staff.  
Note that we assume the distribution of respondents between the two classes – i.e. 
politicians vs. technical staff – to be random and unrelated to any potential determinant of 
differences of opinions that might emerge from the position held on the council. It might be 
claimed that the likelihood of receiving a survey response from a politician correlates with the 
size of the municipality and that this might influence the respondent’s opinion regarding the 
optimal model of production. However, the pair correlation between the binary variable 
denoting with 1 a politician – and 0 a technical staff member – and the municipality’s population 
is -0.0087, that is, less than one percent. Furthermore, a probabilistic regression on the 
probability of the respondent being a politician shows that the coefficient associated with the 




We employ three empirical approaches to compare the opinions expressed by the 
respondents about the three production models considered in the survey for each of the 17 
services included: Public production, contracting out and PPPs.  
1.- Our first approach is to estimate a two-sample t-test (with equal variances) by the 
position held by the respondent. To do so, we create a categorical variable on the degree of 
privatization deemed as being optimal, which takes a value of 0 if the respondent considers the 
optimal model to be public production, 1 if it is considered to be a PPP (both public and private 
participation) and 2 if it is considered to be contracting out (private production). We use this 
variable to estimate mean differences between politicians and technical staff.  
2.- In the second approach we drop PPPs, which are complex contracting modes with 
heterogeneous private involvement, and compare differences in the production model 
preferences (public production vs. contracting out) of politicians and technical staff by means 
of logistic regression. 
3.- Third, we apply a multinomial logistic model to predict differences in the choice of 
production model (here, reintroducing PPPs) made by politicians and technical staff, without 
assuming any strict increase in the degree of private participation depending on the production 
model considered.  
The results from running our first approach are presented in Table 3. For each of the 
services considered we compute the real mean value for the existing production model (Column 
1) and the mean for the declared optimal model according to respondents (Column 2). This 
allows us to compare the average real situation with the average preferred situation. 
Respondents assigned a higher mean value (i.e. a preference for greater private participation) 
to most services, except for water distribution, sewerage collection and street cleaning.  
To verify differences in preferences between politicians and technical staff, Figure 2 
shows the average score awarded to the existing models in the sample for all services considered 
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and the average scores for the optimal model as reported by technical staff and politicians, 
respectively.   
(Insert Figure 2 around here) 
Next, we estimate the mean difference and its statistical significance between politicians 
and technical staff. Column 1 shows the mean value of the overall sample, columns 3 and 4 
record the mean values reported by both politicians and technical staff and, finally, column 5 
shows the mean difference and its statistical significance. Inspection shows that politicians tend 
to favor production models with less private involvement than is preferred by technical staff. 
This holds for all services (except for social action, which is not statistically significant), with 
politicians assigning lower values than the mean assigned by technical staff. This means that 
our first hypothesis is not rejected: Politicians have a stronger preference than technical staff 
for public production. 
The differences that are statistically significant – at least at the 10% level – and, 
therefore, the opinions that can be assumed to be significantly different between the two groups 
of respondents, are those associated with water, sewerage, street cleaning, library facilities, 
passenger transport, and environmental action.  Here, it is worth recalling evidence in the 
literature (Bel and Fageda, 2017; Petersen, Houlberg and Christensen, 2015) that suggests 
privatization in the case of social and personal services tends to have a stronger ideological 
influence than privatization in technical services. Our results in Table 3 (also those below, in 
Tables 4 and 5) indicate that technical staff preferences for privatization are particularly 
significant in the case of technical services (those that tend to appear in the lower part of the 
tables, for which private delivery is more frequent), which is consistent with existing evidence. 
(Insert Table 3 around here) 
In the above analysis, however, we assume an ordered interpretation of production 
models based on the amount of private involvement, considering PPPs an intermediate model 
between pure public delivery and contracting out. PPPs can be considered complex contractual 
11 
 
forms that differ from contracting-out models in terms not only of their public entity 
participation, but also of the allocation of tasks, risks and rewards among parties. Indeed, some 
PPPs may involve much more actual private participation (financing, maintenance, operation, 
etc.) than contracting out and this private management may operate in a more flexible, 
unconstrained regulatory framework than exists in contracted-out firms. For this reason, we 
verify our results by reversing the order of PPPs and contracting-out models, but we obtain very 
similar results.  
To avoid problems from including PPP contracts, we also test for differences between 
public production and contracting out without PPPs; thus, we create a binary variable that takes 
a value of 0 for public production and of 1 for contracting out. We then recompute the mean 
values for both politicians and technicians in order to estimate mean differences for each of the 
services. In this case, without PPPs, we find statistical differences between politicians and 
technical staff in their preferences for water distribution, sewerage, passenger transportation 
and environmental actions (results available upon request). In all these services, politicians 
reveal a stronger preference than technical staff for public production.  
However, these descriptive statistics fail to take into consideration the size of the 
municipality. To address this, we apply a multivariate logistic regression to predict how being 
a politician affects the relative opinion expressed on production model optimality with respect 
to that of technical staff. Here we include two covariates that account for size effects. We 
include population (in thousands) and its square, to account for the inverse U-shape of the 
relationship between population and contracting out in Spain (Bel and Miralles, 2003; Bel, 
2006). Size effects are relevant because they are proxies of both economies of scale and the 
managing capacity of the city council. Thus, our logistic regression takes the following form: 
Logit (pi) = ln (pi/1-pi) = α + β1Politiciani + β2 Populationi + β3 Population^2i + εi 
where the probability functions of choosing contracting out and public production as optimal 
models are regressed against the three covariates of interest. Politician refers to a binary 
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variable that takes a value of 1 if the respondent is a politician and 0 if the respondent forms 
part of the technical staff. The rest of the regressors are the number of inhabitants in each 
municipality (Population) and its square (Population^2). 
Table 4 displays our main results, with preferences for the delivery of water distribution, 
sewerage and urban passenger transport presenting statistical differences between politicians 
and technical staff. In the case of library facilities and environmental actions, we are unable to 
derive a probability because the characteristic of being a politician determines perfectly the 
outcome of public production, a finding that is consistent with our previous results. This is a 
clear indication of politicians’ strong preference for public production. In all these services, 
politicians are less likely than technical staff to choose contracting out as the optimal model.  
Recall that we present our results in terms of odds ratios to facilitate interpretation. 
Politicians and technical staff have the same probability of choosing contracting out as the 
optimal model for a specific service if the odds ratio is equal to 1. When lower than 1, it means 
politicians are less likely than technical staff to choose contracting out; when higher than 1, 
politicians are more likely to choose contracting out as the optimal model. According to our 
results, technical staff are more than twice as likely to choose contracting out than politicians 
for water distribution and passenger transport, and almost three times more likely to do so in 
the case of sewerage. 
(Table 4 around here) 
Finally, our third approach allows us to include PPPs and avoids the arbitrary ordering 
of models. We predict the differences in opinion held by politicians and technical staff 
independently, without considering any scale of degree of private delivery for the three 
categories of production model. The most appropriate method for undertaking an analysis of 
this kind in which the different values of a categorical variable (i.e. the production model) 
cannot be meaningfully ordered is the multinomial logistic regression. To run this model, we 
use the categorical variable with the three values directly reported in the survey, where 0 
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denotes public production, 1 denotes PPPs, and 2 denotes contracting out. Our model is 
analogous to a logistic regression where the response variable’s probability distribution is 
multinomial as opposed to binomial. The J-1 multinomial logistic equations compare categories 
1, 2…J-1 to category J (Public Production in our case). The covariates used in the analysis are 
the same as those employed in the logistic regression (i.e. Politician, Population and 
Population^2). 
Table 5 shows our main results regarding differences in opinion between politicians and 
technical staff as to what they consider to be the optimal production model. The multinomial 
logistic regression analysis, however, has to be interpreted by taking the omitted base cases into 
consideration. First, we interpret the coefficients associated with contracting out and PPPs with 
respect to public production (base case omitted). Second, because we include the politicians’ 
opinions and omit those of the technical staff (to avoid perfect collinearity), the coefficients 
have to be interpreted as a mean difference between both groups, that is, a comparison of their 
views on production models with private participation and public production. Thus, a 
statistically significant coefficient means that politicians have a different opinion regarding a 
specific service to that of technical staff concerning the relative optimality of private models 
vs. public production. Here, our results are presented as relative risk ratios as opposed to 
coefficients to facilitate interpretation. A relative risk ratio of 1 means there is no difference in 
the probability of choosing a particular model, a ratio lower than 1 means the probability is less, 
while a ratio higher than 1 means the probability is greater.  
(Insert Table 5 around here) 
Our results show that for water, sewerage, urban passenger transport, fire-fighting and 
prevention and environmental actions (as well as libraries) there are significant differences in 
the opinions expressed by politicians and technical staff.  For these specific services, politicians 
seem to consider public production more optimal than other forms of production involving 
private participation than do technicians. For most of the services, with the exception of water 
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distribution, statistically significant differences are found in relation to opinions concerning 
contracting out with respect to public production. For instance, the probability of politicians 
choosing contracting out as the optimal model for sewerage is one third that of technical staff 
making the same choice. As regards PPPs, only water distribution appears to offer a 
significantly different prediction for this form of delivery and, so, we opted to only show the 
results for contracting out. Note, however, that for several services there are no statistical 
differences in the opinions of politicians and technical staff.   
Our analysis can also usefully consider the ideology of the politicians that responded to 
the survey.1 Using a scale between 1 (extreme left) and 7 (extreme right) – with 4 being the 
‘center’ – survey respondents indicated the ideological position of the council. We identified as 
leftist councils those declaring values below 4, while values from 4 to 7 are considered to be 
center or rightist. The average ideology of municipalities is 3.2, with a standard deviation of 
1.0 and minimum and maximum values of 1 and 5, respectively. Interestingly, politicians report 
slightly lower values on the ideology scale (2.8), indicating more leftist municipalities than the 
ideology reported in surveys completed by technical staff (3.6).  
 Thus, our logistic regression takes the following form: 
Logit (pi) = ln (pi/1-pi) = α + β1Left_Politiciani + β2 Right_Politiciani + β3Population 
+ β4Population^2i + εi 
where Left_Politician is a binary variable that takes a value of 1 if the respondent belongs to a 
leftist political party and 0 otherwise. Right_Politician takes a value of 1 if the respondent 
belongs to a rightist or center political party. Results should be interpreted in comparison to the 
                                                          
1 Our survey measures the ideology of the local council, according to the survey respondent opinion. 
Note we do not have information about the ideology of the technical staff. However, in the case of 
politicians, who are either elected themselves or appointed by elected politicians to take political action 




omitted category, which in our case is technical staff. The rest of the regressors are the number 
of inhabitants of the municipality (Population) and its square (Population^2). 
Table 6 shows the results of the logistic regression when PPPs are excluded from the 
sample. We observe that our previous logistic regression results concerning the lower 
probability of politicians choosing contracting out as the optimal model for water distribution, 
sewerage and fire services are determined by leftist politicians. The results present interesting 
differences according to ideology. Indeed, some of the differences in opinion found in the 
previous analysis (Table 5) seem, in most services, to be led by respondents with a left-wing 
ideology. Center-and-right politicians present statistically significant differences in opinion 
with respect to those technical staff (i.e. between public production and contracting out) for just 
fire-fighting and prevention, libraries, environmental actions and public transportation. For all 
other services, their views are the same as those of technical staff.  
(Insert Table 6 around here) 
All the analyses performed are consistent with our first proposition, namely, that 
politicians have a stronger preference for public production than technical staff. For many 
services we find this difference to be statistically significant, and we do not find the opposite 
result (politicians expressing a preference for private participation) in any case when comparing 
public production and contracting out. Interestingly, we find that the statistically significant 
preference for public production (with respect to technical staff) is more frequent in the case of 
leftist politicians than in that of their center and rightist counterparts.  
 
Reforms in service delivery choices 
By cross referencing responses regarding the status quo of the production model and opinions 
about the optimal delivery model, we can obtain the reform preferences of both politicians and 
technical staff. We understand a reform preference as being any difference between the current 
model and the optimal model, regardless of whether more or less private sector involvement is 
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preferred. Thus, we can test how inclined politicians are to introduce reform with respect to 
technical staff for all 17 services. To do so, we run a logistic regression that takes the following 
form: 
Logit (pi) = ln (pi/1-pi) = α + β1Politiciani + β2Population + β3Population^2i + εi 
where now the probability of declaring a preference for reform is regressed against three 
covariates. The first of these is a binary variable, denoted by Politician, that takes a value of 1 
if the respondent is a politician and 0 otherwise. The rest of the regressors are the number of 
inhabitants of the municipality (Population) and its square (Population^2)  
The second column in Table 7 shows our results. For four of the services, we find 
statistically significant differences between politicians and technicians. Thus, politicians seem 
less inclined than technical staff to undertake reforms in water distribution, sewerage, 
cemeteries and environmental actions. There is no single service for which politicians are more 
inclined to initiate reform.  
(Insert Table 7 around here) 
Next, we obtain more detailed outcomes by accounting for the ideology of the 
politicians. Columns 5 and 7 in Table 7 indicate whether politicians are more or less inclined 
to undertake reforms with respect to technical staff. We find that leftist politicians are relatively 
less inclined to undertake reforms in the same four services listed above, but to these we can 
now add road pavement and signaling and access roads to population enclaves. As for center 
and rightist politicians, we find their stance to be closely aligned with that of technical staff in 
relation to all services, with the exception of libraries, civil protection and waste treatment. For 
these services, politicians are also more reluctant to initiate reform. 
All in all, the results obtained in this section are consistent with our second proposition: 
Politicians have a weaker preference than technical staff for reforming the organization of 
service delivery. This outcome could indicate, as is to be expected, that politicians’ preferences 
do not differ greatly from the policies they actually apply, given that elections allow 
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governments to be changed frequently if the citizens are unhappy with their service delivery 
models. In this regard, our results may reflect that politicians are more successful to realize their 
preferences than technical staff. In contrast, technical staff cannot be replaced so easily and, 
therefore, there is a greater mismatch between the current model and the preferred model of 
delivery among this latter group.  
 
Going private vs. going public 
So far, we have found that respondents seem to prefer a production model reform that best fits 
with the model they consider to be optimal. However, we have not yet examined the direction 
that this reform should take, i.e. whether it should seek more or less private participation. 
Figures A1 and A2 (see Appendix) show the percentage number of respondents that declared a 
preference for a production model reform that would imply, respectively, a lower and a higher 
presence of private participation for the 17 services. 
The preference for remunicipalizations seems to be highly concentrated in services such as 
urban passenger transport, waste collection and treatment, and water and sewerage, which are 
the main services that would be remunicipalized if respondents could implement the production 
model they believe to be optimal. In contrast, libraries and environmental actions are the 
services mentioned least by respondents in this regard.  
On the other hand, urban passenger transport, waste collection and water distribution are 
the main services for which respondents indicated a preference for a higher participation of the 
private sector, either in the form of a PPP or contracting out.  
To understand better the preferred direction of reforms, we created two variables – Remi 
and Privi (specific to each of the i services) – to estimate the differences in preferences of 
politicians and technical staff. Remi takes a value of 1 if the respondent considers public 
production to be the optimal model although the current model employed in their municipality 
is either contracting out or a PPP, and 0 otherwise. This variable, therefore, captures the 
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preference for full remunicipalization: A reform from private models towards in-house 
production. Privi
 takes a value of 1 if the respondent considers private production (PPP or 
contracting out) to be the optimal model although the current model employed in their 
municipality is that of public production.  
Our results for the two logistic regression models (Privi and Remi) present differences 
between politicians and technical staff (see Table 8). Regardless of whether we examine the 
preference for privatization or for remunicipalization, we do not find any statistically significant 
differences for most services. However, where structural differences occur, they are always 
indicative of the weaker preference of politicians for reform. Given the size of our subsamples, 
politician status predicts failure perfectly in some services, which means they opt for ‘no 
reform’ in all their responses. 
(Insert Table 8 around here) 
The proposition that politicians have a weaker preference for reform finds some support in the 
case of both privatizations and remunicipalization. However, here, our results are less robust 
because of certain sample limitations, which result in excessively small subsamples as we 
fragmented our data. We obtain a weak indication that technical staff may exert some pressure 
for the remunicipalization of various services – with respect to politicians, but the same holds 
for reforms in favor of privatization. This is consistent with the view that the pressure for 
remunicipalization (as well as that for privatization) is more pragmatic than ideological.  
 
Conclusion 
Robust empirical evidence on the drivers of remunicipalization remains scarce. Preliminary 
findings suggest that the role played by ideology is minor. In most services we observe that 
more pragmatic reasons account for decisions to remunicipalize. However, very little is known 
about the potential differences between politicians and technical staff regarding choices of 
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delivery form. The same is true of their respective propensities to engage in reforms, where 
remunicipalization is just one option.  
All the analyses performed suggest that politicians as opposed to technical staff have a 
greater preference for public production, though this preference (compared to that of technical 
staff) is more frequent in the case of leftist than it is of center/rightist politicians. This is 
consistent with views that technical staff are more capable of managing contracts, which is a 
likely determinant of their preference for contractual forms. Similarly, it is consistent with the 
view that public production places more control in the hands of politicians, while technical staff 
may have a more relevant role to play in supervising and monitoring contracts.  
Our results also suggest that politicians are less likely than technical staff to want to 
reform the organization of service delivery. This preference holds both for leftist and 
center/rightist politicians. When we distinguish between pro-privatization and pro-
remunicipalization reforms, we still observe a lower propensity among politicians for reform, 
in both cases. However, we need to treat these last results with caution, because the more 
fragmented the sample became, the less robust our results were. 
Indeed, the preceding analysis suffers from various limitations. The main shortcoming 
is the limited number of available observations. On the one hand, the small number of 
completed surveys places stricter requirements on statistical significance throughout our results. 
This in turn prevents us from breaking down the data to undertake further analyses. Clearly, 
expanding the sample would help us obtain more robust and more refined results. On the other 
hand, given our sample size and the information this affords, potential endogeneity issues exist, 
as there is no quasi-random sorting mechanism into the group of politicians and bureaucrats. 
However, it is impossible to check for any potential biases, such as selection bias or 
endogeneity, which advises to interpret our results with caution. In this regard, further analyses 




Our results open up interesting avenues for further research. While incentives and views 
on public and private delivery choices are likely to play a role in the difference in preferences 
between politicians and technical staff, it might well be that other management related issues 
such as contract management difficulties, available competition or citizen interests also play a 
role in explaining these differences. 
 
References 
Alesina, Alberto and Guido Tabellini. 2007. “Bureaucrats or Politicians? Part I: A Single Policy 
Task.” American Economic Review 97 (1): 169-179 
Alesina, Alberto and Guido Tabellini. 2008. “Bureaucrats or Politicians? Part II: Multiple 
Policy Tasks.” Journal of Public Economics 92 (3-4): 426-447. 
Andrews, Rhys and George Boyne. 2010. “Capacity, Leadership, and Organizational 
Performance: Testing the Black Box Model of Public Management.” Public 
Administration Review 70 (3): 443-454 
Bel, Germà. 2006. Economía y política de la privatización local. Madrid: Marcial Pons. 
Bel, Germà and Xavier Fageda. 2017. “What have we learned from the last Three Decades of 
Empirical Studies on Factors Driving Local Privatisation?” Local Government Studies 43 
(4): 503-511. 
Bel, Germà and Antonio Miralles. 2003. “Factors Influencing the Privatisation of Urban Solid 
Waste Collection in Spain.” Urban Studies 40 (7): 1323-1334. 
Berliner, Daniel and Aaron Erlich. 2015. “Competing for Transparency: Political Competition 
and Institutional Reform in Mexican States.” American Political Science Review 109 (1): 
110-128. 
Bernecker, Andreas. 2016. “Divided we reform? Evidence from US welfare policies.” Journal 
of Public Economics 124: 24-38. 
21 
Campos-Alba, Cristina, Emilio Higuera-Molina, Gemma Pérez-López and José L. Zafra-
Gómez. 2017. “Explanatory factors in the renewal of contracts for the privatisation of 
public services.” Journal of Strategic Contracting and Negotiation 3 (1): 3–19.  
Chong, Eshien, Stéphane Saussier and Brian Silverman. 2015. “Water Under the Bridge: 
Determinants of Franchise Renewal in Water Provision.” Journal of Law, Economics, 
and Organization 31(suppl 1): i3–i39. 
Dunleavy, Patrick. 1991. Democracy, Bureaucracy and Public Choice. Economic Approaches 
in Political Science. London: Routledge. 
Enikolopov, Ruben. 2014. “Politicians, bureaucrats and targeted redistribution.” Journal of 
Public Economics 120: 74–83. 
Gradus, Raymond and Tjerk Budding. Forthcoming. “Political and Institutional Explanations 
for Increasing Re- municipalization.” Urban Affairs Review forthcoming. 
Gradus, Raymond, Martijn Schoute and Tjerk Budding. 2019. “Shifting modes of service 
delivery in Dutch local government.” Journal of Economic Policy Reform, this issue 
Hart, Oliver D., Andrei Shleifer and Robert Vishny. 1997. “The proper scope of government: 
Theory and an application to prisons.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 112 (4): 1127–
1161. 
Hefetz, Amir and Mildred Warner. 2004. “Privatization and its Reverse: Explaining the 
Dynamics of the Government Contracting Process.” Journal of Public Administration 
Research and Theory 14 (2): 171-190. 
Hefetz, Amir and Mildred Warner. 2007. “Beyond the Market Versus Planning Dichotomy: 
Understanding Privatisation and its Reverse in US cities.” Local Government Studies 33 
(4): 555-572. 
Hefetz, Amir and Mildred Warner. 2012. “Contracting or public delivery? The importance of 
service, market and management characteristics.” Journal of Public Administration 
Research and Theory 22 (2): 289–317. 
22 
Hood, Christopher. 2010. The Blame Game. Spin, Bureaucracy, and Self-Preservation in 
Government. Princeton. NJ: Princeton University Press. 
James, Oliver. 2003. The Executive Agency Revolution in Whitehall. Public Interest versus 
Bureau-Shaping Perspectives. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK. 
Petersen, Ole H., Kurt Houlberg and Lasse R. Christensen. 2015. “Contracting Out Local 
Services: A Tale of Technical and Social Services.” Public Administration Review 75 (4): 
560-570.
Voorn, Bart, Marieke van Genugten and Sandra van Thiel. 2019. “A re-municipalization re-
interpretation: Finding equilibrium.” Journal of Economic Policy Reform, this issue. 
Warner, Mildred and Austin Aldag. 2019. “Re-municipalization in the US: A Pragmatic 
Response to Contracting.” Journal of Economic Policy Reform, this issue. 
 Warner, Mildred and Germà Bel. 2008. “Competition or monopoly? Comparing privatization 
of local public services in the US and Spanish.” Public Administration 86 (3): 723-735. 
Warner, Mildred and Robert Hebdon. 2001. “Local Government Restructuring: Privatization 
and its Alternatives.” Journal of Policy Analysis and Management 20 (2): 315-336. 
Warner, Mildred and Amir Hefetz. 2012. “Insourcing and Outsourcing: the Dynamics of 
Privatization among US Municipalities 2002–2007.” Journal of the American Planning 











0 82.5 91.8 88.7 
1 8.2 4.1 6.2 
2 3.1 1.0 4.1 





Table 2.  Sample’s distribution of current production models by service (%). 
Service Public Production Contracting Out PPPs 
Library 97.8 2.2 0.0 
Environment  90.9 4.5 4.6 
Civil protection 89.2 4.0 6.8 
Social Action 85.9 4.7 9.4 
Cemetery 85.2 10.2 4.6 
Facilities 82.6 6.5 10.9 
Fire  81.7 11.3 7.0 
Access 79.7 12.7 7.6 
Road 75.0 16.3 8.7 
Parks 65.2 25.0 9.8 
Public Lights 60.4 30.8 8.8 
Sewerage 54.3 35.9 9.8 
Cleaning 54.3 42.4 3.3 
Water 44.6 41.3 14.1 
Passenger Transport 43.8 45.3 10.9 
Waste Treatment 37.2 38.4 24.4 






















Library 0.05 0.06 0 0.12 -0.12**
Environment  0.14 0.32 0.10 0.51 -0.41***
Civil protection 0.13 0.20 0.13 0.25 -0.12
Social Action 0.17 0.23 0.26 0.20 0.06
Cemetery 0.25 0.36 0.25 0.44 -0.19
Facilities 0.23 0.39 0.27 0.49 -0.22*
Fire  0.20 0.24 0.22 0.26 -0.04
Access 0.28 0.58 0.46 0.69 -0.23
Road 0.40 0.66 0.56 0.74 -0.18
Parks 0.59 0.62 0.54 0.69 -0.15
Public Lights 0.66 0.70 0.59 0.80 -0.21
Sewerage 0.78 0.70 0.49 0.89 -0.40**
Cleaning 0.85 0.79 0.60 0.95 -0.35**
Water  0.97 0.83 0.64 1.00 -0.36**
Passenger Transport 0.64 0.78 0.58 0.94 -0.36**
Waste Treatment 0.90 1.05 1.00 1.09 -0.09
Waste Collection 1.04 1.08 0.95 1.20 -0.25
*,**,*** statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
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Table 4. Logistic regression prediction on the opinion of politicians with respect to 
technical staff on contracting out (Coefficients transformed into Odds ratios) 
Service Contracting 
out 
p-value Pop Pop^2 Wald 
Chi2 
Library - Nc +* -* 4.12 
Environment - Nc   3.41 
Civil protection 0.20 0.155     20.10*** 
Social Action 1.54 0.660   0.72 
Cemetery 0.73 0.591 +**   6.95* 
Facilities 0.45 0.120     2.91 
Fire  0.19* 0.072     6.55* 
Access  0.71 0.327 +*   6.40* 
Roads 0.62 0.388     21.71*** 
Parks 0.91 0.830     3.14 
Public Lights 0.66 0.180     4.57 
Sewerage 0.37** 0.046   8.29** 
Cleaning 0.69 0.247     8.72** 
Water 0.43* 0.065 +*** -*** 20.79*** 
Passenger Transport 0.43** 0.027 +*  8.57** 
Waste Treatment 0.95 0.912 +* -** 12.31*** 
Waste Collection 0.70 0.412   7.78* 
Note:  Standard errors in parentheses are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustered by region 




Table 5. Multinomial Logistic Regressions on the opinion of politicians with respect to 
technical staff on the optimal model of production (base category: public production. 
Coefficients transformed into Relative Risk Ratios).  
 Service Contracting 
out 
p-value Pop Pop^2 Wald Chi2 
Library - Nc     Nc 
Environment*** 3.16e-10* 0.099     1044.86*** 
Civil Protect.*** 0.19 0.149     101.74*** 
Social Action 1.58 0.646     5.55 
Cemetery 0.74 0.601 +**   9.21 
Facilities 0.46 0.133     15.17** 
Fire  0.20* 0.079     22.02*** 
Access  0.71 0.340 +* -* 7.79 
Roads 0.63 0.410     134.26*** 
Parks 0.91 0.835     23.02*** 
Public Lights 0.66 0.177     16.32** 
Sewerage 0.36** 0.042     39.82*** 
Cleaning 0.68 0.236     268.48*** 
Water 0.50 0.161 +* -* 45.16*** 
Passenger Transport 0.43** 0.025 +*   9.74 
Waste Treatment 1.06 0.883 +** -** 10.42* 
Waste Collection 0.68 0.41     3.58 
Note:  Standard errors in parentheses are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustered by region (NUTS 2).  




Table 6. Logistic regression prediction on the opinion of politicians with respect to technical staff on contracting out (Coefficients transformed 
into Odds Ratios) 
Service Leftist p-value Center and Right p-value Pop Pop^2 Wald Chi2 
Library - Nc - Nc +* -* 4.12 
Environment - Nc - Nc   3.41 
Civil protection - Nc  2.85 0.467     1.87 
Social Action 1.24 0.845 2.68 0.483     0.69 
Cemetery 0.47 0.342 1.85 0.465 +**   6.89 
Facilities 0.35 0.222 0.85 0.845     2.58 
Fire  0.21* 0.096 - Nc   6.05 
Access  0.59 0.394 1.19 0.852 +* -*   5.87* 
Roads 0.45 0.145 1.49 0.753     22.02*** 
Parks 0.75 0.455 1.7 0.637     3.09 
Public Lights 0.53 0.202 1.25 0.816   4.77 
Sewerage 0.30* 0.100 0.92 0.926   7.66* 
Cleaning 0.63 0.271 0.99 0.998   9.17* 
Water 0.33* 0.091 1.30 0.766   22.00*** 
Passenger Trans 0.54 0.186 0.20*** 0.000 +*   21.27*** 
Waste Treatment 0.9 0.829 1.13 0.864 +* -** 17.05*** 
Waste Collection 0.69 0.515 0.66 0.618     7.83* 
Notes:  Standard errors in parentheses are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustered by region (NUTS 2). Info on population in the last columns belongs to estimations for 
services in the central column ‘Services’.  *,**,*** statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.
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Table 7. Logistic Regressions on the preference for production model reform. (Dependent 
variable is the probability of declaring a preference for reform. Coefficients transformed 




























Library 0.34 0.360   2.91 0.508 0.000 - Nc 2.96 
Environment 0.42*   0.058 8.29** 0.39* 0.058 0.55 0.552 9.37* 
Civil Protection 0.27 0.162 5.20 0.34 0.229 - Nc 4.46 
Social Action 0.62 0.405 33.29*** 0.56   0.391   0.86 0.869 32.76*** 
Cemetery 0.21** 0.028 16.21*** 0.12* 0.069 0.51 0.382   21.36*** 
Facilities 0.94 0.870   4.61 0.67 0.508   2.46 0.182 7.58 
Fire  0.54 0.271 21.59*** 0.54 0.342 0.52 0.532 25.10*** 
Access  0.42 0.360 22.12*** - Nc 3.18 0.325 25.83*** 
Roads 0.36 0.167 5.95 0.29** 0.034 0.69 0.781 7.63 
Parks 1.04 0.923 3.56 0.93 0.862 1.54 0.588 4.74 
Public Lights 1.04 0.885 11.17** 0.86 0.728   1.95 0.424 10.01** 
Sewerage 0.51** 0.019 14.22*** 0.53* 0.100 0.42 0.186   32.91*** 
Cleaning 0.83 0.668 13.76*** 0.72 0.546 1.35 0.753 19.96*** 
Water 0.57* 0.097 11.00** 0.52* 0.089 0.80 0.742 11.86** 
Passenger Trans. 0.73 0.714 16.35*** 0.60 0.503 1.18 0.899 15.44*** 
Waste Treatment 0.99 0.989 3.71   1.30 0.404  - Nc 7.39* 
Waste Collection 1.24 0.557   7.17* 1.65 0.147 0.29 0.186 81.17*** 
 Note: All models control for population size of the municipality (to facilitate reading of results, we omit results 
for population as they are only significant for cemeteries). Standard errors are clustered by region. *,**,*** refer 





Table 8. Logistic regression on the preference of politicians with respect to technical staff 
on full remunicipalization and privatization by service.  









Library - Nc 9.49*** - Nc - 
Environment 0.44 0.148 5.10 - Nc   74.23*** 
Civil protection 0.33 0.295 16.20*** - Nc 3.24 
Social Action 3.14 0.160 2.56 0.00 0.270 33.80*** 
Cemetery - Nc 1.67 - Nc 55.58*** 
Facilities 1.34 0.666 32.45***   0.56 0.662 17.77*** 
Fire  0.47 0.620 3.33 0.25 0.226 6.06*** 
Access  0.39 0.455 3.6 0.79 0.881 3.70 
Roads 0.51 0.586 4.58 - Nc 0.62 
Parks 0.55 0.635 5.65 0.58 0.696 7.70 
Public Lights 2.61 0.539 4.50 0.73 0.570 8.86** 
Sewerage 0.47 0.279 1.19   1.24 0.737 10.99*** 
Cleaning - Nc 7.96** 0.26 0.328 68.12*** 
Water 0.69 0.500 5.49*** 0.90 0.847 136.73*** 
Passenger Transport 2.08 0.582 24.23*** 1.15 0.768 11.72*** 
Solid Waste Treatment 0.381 0.105 7.60* 0.59 0.576 22.80*** 
Solid Waste Collection 0.59 0.434 3.21 0.62 0.543 11.78*** 
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Figure 2. Comparison between real model and optimal model by group of respondents 
(Politicians and Technical staff).  






















Table A1. Services included in the survey and descriptions 
Service Description 
Water Supply and distribution of drinking water 
Sewerage Maintenance of the sewerage network 
Waste collection Collection of urban solid waste 
Waste Treatment Urban solid waste treatment 
Cleaning Road cleaning service 
Roads Paving, repair and signaling of public roads 
Parks Maintenance of Parks and gardens 
Public Lights Maintenance of public lighting 
Civil Protection Civil protection and deployment of emergency assistance 
Fire  Prevention and extinction of fires 
Library Public library 
Cemetery Management and maintenance of the municipal cemetery 
Facilities Management and maintenance of sports facilities for public use 
Accesses Access to population enclaves 
Passenger Transport Urban public transport for passengers 
Environment Protection of the urban environment 






Figure A1. Percentage of respondents declaring a preference for remunicipalization by 






























































































































































Figure A2. Percentage of respondents declaring a preference for privatization by 
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